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The Peace-Making Role of a Mediator
JOHN D. FEERICK*
The office of mediator requires as great a degree of integrity, as of
prudence and address. He ought to observe a strict impartiality; he should
soften the reproaches of the disputants, calm their resentments and dispose
their minds to a reconciliation. .

.

. There cannot be a more beneficent

office, and more becoming a great prince, than that of reconciling two
nations at war, and thus putting a stop to the effusion of human blood: it is
the indispensable duty of those who have the means of performing it with
success. 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation, or the intervention of third parties, has been a tested and tried
means of dispute resolution since the earliest history of the world. It was
widely used in both Rome and Egypt and by the Greek city-states in
connection with their wars. Indeed, emperors and rulers at different points in
history were called on to assist in the resolution of disputes involving other
states and nations. Louis IX became world renowned in that role, sought both
from inside and outside his country to arbitrate and mediate disputes. 2 More
recently, we have witnessed a former President of the United States, Jimmy
Carter, playing such a role on the world stage, and his former Secretary of
State, Cyrus Vance, one of my great heroes, played such a role as well. The

citation accompanying the Nobel Peace Prize given to President Carter spoke
3
admiringly and deservedly of his role in mediating disputes.

* In connection with this Article, I have been the beneficiary of communications
from many fine people who are or have been involved with mediation in Northern
Ireland, and I express to each my deep gratitude. They are: Avery Bowser, Dominic
Bryan, Brian Currin, Michael Doherty, Seamus Dunn, Brendan McAllister, Billy
Robinson, Brian Speers and Sue Williams. Most especially, I thank my colleague
Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, my assistant, Derek Hackett, and Fordham Law
School students McKenzie Livingston and Jeremy Klatell for their enormous assistance
with this undertaking.
1 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, bk. II, ch. XVIII, § 328 and bk. IV, ch.
II, § 17 (1835).
2 THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Louis IX, (5th ed. 1993).
3 When awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to President Carter in 2002, the Norwegian
Nobel Committee described Carter's mediation as a "vital contribution" to the Camp
David Accords and further stated that Carter has "stood by the principles that conflicts
must as far as possible be resolved through mediation and international co-operation
based on international law, respect for human rights, and economic development." 2002
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Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, spoke often of the
importance of mediation and other forms of dispute resolution as a way to
avoid or end hostilities. 4 Given the consequences of war, Grotius emphasized
the importance of using such approaches, pointing to historical and
successful examples of third party intervention. Not surprisingly, the United
5
Nations Charter singles out mediation as a major tool of dispute resolution.
The theme for this program, the Americanization of International Dispute
Resolution, asks whether there is an American style of dispute resolution
and, if there is, whether it is positive or negative for the peaceful settlement
of international disputes. In approaching my assignment of Mediation in
Armed Conflict, I have focused my attention on Northern Ireland, a society
that has experienced a violent conflict for the past thirty years, in which
many efforts at mediation have taken place at all levels of the society. 6 There
have been mediation successes and some failures but its usefulness as a
7
means of mitigating conflict in the North is clear.
Part I of this Article provides a brief description of the American
mediation process through the lens of my experiences as a mediator. Part II
examines the conflict in Northern Ireland and the tools used by George
Mitchell during the peace process. Part LIH analyzes criticisms of the use of
the so-called American-style of mediation in international conflicts.

1. AMERICAN MEDIATION PRACTICE
Perhaps is it provocative to ask whether there is an American style of
mediation. I would begin by noting that there are many styles in helping
parties reach agreement. One approach is that of a facilitative role, helping
parties communicate with each other, identifying their interests, and
Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to President Carter, Oct. 11, 2002, available at
http://www.cartercenter.org/viewdoc.asp?doclD= 1235&submenu=news.
4 HUGO GROT1US, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, bk. II, ch. XXIII, pt. VIII and bk.
I1, ch. XX, pt. XLVI (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1962).
5 U.N. CHARTER, art. 33(1) states that "[tihe parties to any dispute, the continuance
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
of their own choice."
6 For a detailed description of the conflict in Northern Ireland, see J. BOWYER BELL,
THE IRISH TROUBLES: A GENERATION OF VIOLENCE 1967-1992 (1993). For political and
academic commentary on the peace process see Seamus Dunn & Jacqueline NolanHaley, Conflict in Northern Ireland After the Good Friday Agreement, 22 FORDHAM
INT'LL.J. 1372 (1999).
7 Dunn & Nolan-Haley, supra note 6, at 1379-82.
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exploring with them options for resolving their dispute. Another method used
by mediators involves defining the problem broadly, looking at all the
interests of the parties, and engaging them in a problem-solving,
collaborative process. A third approach relies on evaluations-providing
information and offering views, opinions and proposals on the subject of the
dispute. Yet another approach combines all of the above approaches, in
different, or even in the same mediation, depending on the wishes of the
parties and sometimes at the initiative of the mediator in the particular
dispute.
Despite style differences, there is certainly wide agreement among
mediation practitioners on the importance of a mediator being neutral and
impartial. There is also agreement on the importance of the process being fair
and party-oriented. To assure neutrality, mediators make disclosures of
possible conflicts, avoid conduct that may give the appearance of partiality
toward one of the parties, and respect the right of a party to reach a
voluntary, uncoerced agreement. To assure fairness, mediators keep the
secrets and confidences of the parties and make commitments to diligence
and procedural fairness. There is also consensus on the need for mediators to
be able to meet the reasonable expectations of the parties-to be competent
in serving as an intermediary in helping them find a solution. However, the
widest of agreement is on the importance of the mediator having the qualities
essential for inspiring confidence and trust. Even-handedness, commitment,
independence, and good judgment are among these, as well as such qualities
as being patient, calm, humble, and a good listener. An example of a
mediator who embodies such qualities is George Mitchell, a former United
States Senator, who chaired the peace talks in Northern Ireland. In his book
describing the peace process, George Mitchell observed, "[f]or the two years
of negotiations, I listened and listened, and then I listened some more. At
times it was interesting, at times entertaining; it was also often repetitive,
frustrating, and deliberately quarrelsome."' 8 He added, "I believe in letting
people have their say. It was important, I told them, not to cut anyone off at
this stage. When the right time comes, I said, I'll bring this to a conclusion."9
As a lawyer who grew up in the world of labor management disputes,
particularly in the area of newspaper disputes, I became accustomed to
10
positions being repeated again and again, along with the flexing of muscle.

8 GEORGE MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE ix (1999).

9 Id. at 86.

10 Each side to a collective bargaining agreement often hints at or reminds the other
party of its ability to, in the case of the employer, lockout and, in the case of the union,
strike, if its needs or demands are not met. A union might take a strike vote of its
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It was not unusual in collective bargaining negotiations to have the
intervention of mediators, who used a variety of tools and strategies to reach
a solution to the dispute at hand. Among these were the use of committees,
subcommittees, caucuses, and shuttle diplomacy to foster communication,
which eventually moved to around the clock negotiations and, at the point of
exhaustion, hopefully, an agreement. Often, in the final agreement
committees were established to study and report on intractable issues
incapable of resolution at the point of the settlement. Sometimes, if it
appeared that ratification was in jeopardy, accompanying letters were drafted
to explain what was meant by a paragraph. As for disagreements concerning
what had been agreed to, the agreement itself usually provided for arbitration
and possibly other steps at resolution before arbitration. Although other kinds
of disputes have their characteristics, these are the patterns I have noticed
through my experiences with the mediation process in the United States in
the field of labor relations.
The growth of mediation in American legal practice has been
transformative, often saving parties the enormous cost, delay, and trauma of
traditional litigation. Increasingly, court programs require parties to mediate,
or at least offer that as an option, and more and more business contracts
contain provisions for the use of mediation before litigation. Typically, in
these situations, a third party designated by the parties or by a procedure
which they have agreed upon, meets with them, learns something about their
dispute, receives information, both orally and in written form, and then
develops with them a process involving both general and private meetings,
along with intervening caucuses and shuttle diplomacy, to narrow the
differences and find an acceptable resolution.
This very brief summary of mediation in America obviously just touches
the surface.
I. NORTHERN IRELAND
Why have I chosen to focus on Northern Ireland? I am certainly no
expert on that country, which I have come to like very much. I, however,
have been involved, through my law school, in a number of activities in the
North. I have been privileged to give talks there before various groups,
including its Law Society, on the subject of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) in the United States. I also have visited Northern Ireland almost a
dozen times since 1995, when I had the honor of being in a group which
accompanied President Clinton on his historic visit to the North.
membership, for example, or an employer might enter into an agreement with a third
party to operate its business in the event of a strike.
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Since President Clinton's visit, much has happened in Northern Ireland.
The country has had a long history of violent conflict, marked by killings,
maiming, and destruction of property. Its soul has been seared by that
conflict and by a deep hatred that goes back centuries. The violence of the
past thirty years has touched almost every street and area in the North. In a
country of one and one-half million inhabitants, it is said that one in every
five hundred has been killed during the conflict and that one in every fifty
has been injured in some way. 1 ' As George Mitchell wrote, "[tiwenty-five
years of brutal sectarian war had scarred the bodies of thousands of men and
women; it had more deeply scarred the hearts of everyone."' 12
But beyond the conflict, I need to add a note about the charm of the
people in the North-their laughter and poetry, as well as their hopes, like
ours, for their children and grandchildren to live in a more peaceful and just
world. The present, with all of its difficulties and challenges, offers such
possibility because of the political framework established by the 1998 Peace
Agreement (hereinafter the Agreement). 13 The Agreement is a tribute to the
work of Senator George Mitchell, the Prime Ministers of Britain and Ireland,
and the leaders of a number of the political parties in the North (two of whom
won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998). 14 However, a word or two about the
conflict in Northern Ireland and the events leading to the peace talks 15 is
necessary.
A. An IntractableConflict
The conflict is often expressed in religious terms as a clash between
Catholics and Protestants. To be sure, religion plays some part, as do lack of
employment and other socio-economic factors. At the center of the conflict,
however, is the issue of national identity. 16 A great many Protestants want to
keep Northern Ireland in union with the United Kingdom and, consequently,
11 See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 174 (observing that the casualties of the
conflict were 3,200 killed and 36,000 wounded).
121d.
13 Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
Agreement], available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreelinks/agreement.htm. The
Agreement is sometimes referred to as the Good Friday Agreement or the Belfast
Agreement, depending on one's point of view.
14 David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party and John Hume, leader of the
Social Democratic and Labour Party.
15 Also referred to as the all-party or multi-party talks or negotiations.
16 See Stephen Farry & Sean Neeson, Beyond the "Band-Aid" Approach: An
Alliance Party Perspective Upon the Belfast Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1221,
1222-24 (1999).
233
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they are called Unionists. A great many Catholics favor Northern Ireland
becoming part of the Republic of Ireland and thus are labeled Nationalists.
Not every Protestant or Catholic in Northern Ireland, however, can be
identified with these points of view. Nevertheless, these competing identities
lead to divisions on political, social, and cultural levels. 17 Intractable and
incessant division is further perpetuated by a perceived threat each
18
community has regarding the other.
Beginning in the 1980s and continuing through the mid-1990s, a number
of important milestones occurred as a result of negotiations that took place
between the British and Irish governments. These British-Irish agreements
included: an Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, expressing a commitment that
only the people of Northern Ireland could change its constitutional status; a
Downing Street Declaration in 1993, setting out a general formula for
participation in the peace talks by political parties associated with
paramilitary organizations; and a Frameworks Document of 1995, creating
the International Body on Decommissioning and setting a course for all-party
negotiations. Also during this period the Irish and British governments had
separate discussions with the political parties that had allegiances to them.
Among these were discussions between the Irish government and the major
Nationalist parties in the North, namely, the Social Democratic Labor Party
and Sinn Fin (the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA)). 19 All
of these discussions led to cease-fires in 1994 by the IRA and the Combined
Loyalist Military Council. The British and Irish governments served a critical
mediation function in laying the groundwork for the peace negotiations that
began in June 1996.
B. Senator George Mitchell and the Peace Process
Senator Mitchell's appointment in 1996 to chair the all-party talks was
foreshadowed by his assignments in Northern Ireland in 1995, after leaving
the United States Senate. First he was appointed by President Clinton to
organize a trade and investment conference. Then he was chosen as one of
three members of the International Body on Decommissioning established by

17 See generally Barry A. Feinstein & Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable
Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict
Between Israelis and Palestinians,16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1, 43 (2000) (explaining that
the primary reason for the Northern Ireland Troubles-national identity-encompasses
divisions on social, cultural, and political grounds).
18
/d. at44.

19 MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 17.
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the Frameworks Document of 1995.20 In the process he became familiar with
Northern Ireland, its people, leaders, and history. Many in Northern Ireland
also came to know him. Looking more closely at the peace talks as a possible
case study of mediation at its best, one finds the most careful of attention
given by Senator Mitchell to every aspect of the process.
In a word, Senator Mitchell's style was one of extreme sensitivity to the
process, the rules adopted, the views and positions of the parties, and to the
independence of his office. Although his selection by the British and Irish
governments to chair the talks was objected to by some of the political
parties, 2 1 he was given many opportunities to demonstrate his independence
and he did so. At the very outset, he agreed, in the face of strong Unionist
objections, to change the rules that had been agreed to by the British and
Irish governments for the talks. The Senator said, "I felt throughout the
discussions that ultimately my ability to be effective would depend more
upon my gaining the participants' trust and confidence than on the formal
22
description of my authority."
The multi-party talks began with the development of a set of rules of
procedure, which took almost two months to put in place.23 By July 1996
there was agreement on the rules of procedure, which included provisions
dealing with non-compliance by a party with respect to the conditions for
entering into the talks, 24 the formula for voting on proposals, 25 and the
confidentiality of the talks. 26 A period of several months then followed to
20

Id. at 26-27 (describing how Harri Holkeri, a Finn chosen by the Irish, and John
de Chastelain, a Canadian chosen by the British, were the other two members of the Body
on Decommissioning; they later joined Mitchell as the independent chairmen of the peace
talks).
21 Id. at 46-54 (discussing the controversy and opposition surrounding Mitchell's
appointment as chair and further noting that two Protestant political parties-the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP)were adamantly opposed to Mitchell serving as chair).
22

Id. at 57.

23 Id. at 56 (noting that a process which should have taken a few days took seven
weeks due to two basic conflicts: first, the ground rules and related documents agreed
upon by earlier British-Irish agreements were opposed by the Unionists and second, as
noted, some Unionist parties challenged Mitchell's authority as chairman of the talks).
24 Id. at 33 (explaining that in order for a party to enter the talks they had to commit
to the principles of democracy and nonviolence, which eventually became known as the
Mitchell Principles).
25 Id. at 62 (describing the voting procedure contained in the rules-sufficient
consensus-as complex, but also ensuring that any agreement reached in the talks had
broad support among the parties).
26
Id. at 75 (maintaining that "[t]he rules of procedure imposed upon all the
participants a rule of confidentiality" so that the negotiations remained private, but the
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develop a very brief and general agenda for the opening plenary session, and
on October 15, agreement was reached. 27 Once a general agenda had been
established, substantive negotiations could begin, taking place along three
tracks or strands. 28 However the issue of decommissioning-Unionists
wanted paramilitary arms to be given up before negotiations could beginarose postponing substantive negotiations for some months.
During discussions on decommissioning and subsequent negotiations,
Senator Mitchell and his colleagues conducted many meetings with the
parties through the use of strands to deal with global kinds of issues,
subcommittees, smaller group meetings, and informal and individual
meetings. They constantly put questions to the parties, asking for their
responses and positions, both orally and in writing. They sought to
understand each party's needs and fears and then to communicate them to the
other parties as well as allowing the parties to directly communicate with
each other through various formats. They created options for the parties to
consider, drew them into every aspect of the process, and used caucuses,
shuttle diplomacy, and smaller group discussions to find areas of agreement.
Plenary sessions were convened judiciously to receive reports, to have
exchanges at times, and to deal with important issues affecting the talks that
had arisen. By November 10, 1997, opening discussions were complete and
the parties were ready to get into active negotiations. 29 To jump-start the
negotiations, Senator Mitchell created a document identifying the key issues
for resolution to generate some give and take. 30 As he noted, "[o]nly when all
of the issues were seen together could all the parties get a sense of where the
31
necessary trade-offs and compromises might be made."
Throughout the negotiations, Senator Mitchell and his colleagues paid a
great deal of attention to the importance of symbols, appearances, and ways
to facilitate communications. For example, while most of the negotiations
took place at Stormont, a suburb of Belfast, they were commenced in an
undistinguished government office building rather than the building from
32
which a Protestant-dominated Parliament once governed the North.
opposite occurred with leaks and press conferences becoming quite regular throughout
the all-party talks).
27

Id. at 84.

28 Id. at 120 Strand One dealt with the political arrangements in Northern Ireland,
Strand Two dealt with relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic, and Strand
Three addressed relations between the British and Irish governments. Id.
29 Id. at 122-23.
30

Id.at 123.

31 Id.
32

Id.at 48 (describing how the Parliament building was regarded by Nationalists as

a symbol of Unionist domination).
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Similarly, when some of the negotiations left Belfast, they were held in both
London and Dublin so that both communities would not see a tilt in favor of
the other. 33 Care was also given to limiting the number of people who would
be present at key meetings in order to encourage dialogue, and also to
whether the presence of a stenographer or note taker might chill discussion. 34
As the negotiations entered 1998, the agenda became more specific and the
meetings more frequent with a deadline imposed to build a momentum
toward an agreement. Senator Mitchell expressed the importance of a
steadfast deadline in reaching an agreement:
I began to think about a deadline, earlier than the one at the end of May
that Blair had already set ...without a hard deadline these people just
would not decide anything: the decisions are so fraught with danger for
them that they would just keep talking and talking and talking. Eventually,
this process would just peter out or, more likely, some dramatic outside
event-some new atrocity-would just blow it up. Either way, it would fail.
It had to be brought to an end; that was the only possible way to get an
agreement. A deadline would not guarantee success, but the absence of a
35
deadline would guarantee failure.
Eventually Easter weekend of 1998 was set as the deadline and the
parties unanimously agreed. 36 On April 10, 1998, after nearly two years of
talks and negotiations, an agreement was reached.
The process reflected a number of approaches and mechanisms used in
the field of American labor relations, such as committees and subcommittees,
smaller group discussions, and the creation of committees in the final
agreement for issues that were not capable of resolution at the point of the
final agreement. Far more than format, location, and the like was the constant
sensitivity of the Senator to each of the parties engaged in the process. He
met with them frequently and separately over every aspect of the talks, made
sure their views were understood and advanced, sought their suggestions for
solutions, and circulated to them for comment drafts of documents containing
questions, issues, and options. The respect he gave to each made it their
process and inspired confidence in him and his colleagues.

33 Id. at 125 & 135.
34 Id. at 124.
31 Id. at 126.
36 Id. at 143 (describing Easter weekend as an appropriate deadline because it had
historical significance, was an important weekend in a religious society such as Northern
Ireland, and if an agreement was reached by Easter, a referendum could be held in May
and an assembly election could take place by late June).
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The manner in which Senator Mitchell conducted himself throughout the
talks made its success possible. For example, despite the confidentiality of
the talks, leaks were commonplace, and yet, the parties came to understand
that the Senator (and his colleagues) would make no exception for
themselves regarding the confidential nature of the talks. This proved
providential because when the first draft of the final agreement was
circulated in April 1998, confidentiality was of critical importance and when
Senator Mitchell demanded it at that point, the parties complied. 37 Also
interesting to note, in terms of the personal role of a mediator, is the tone
struck by Senator Mitchell in his public statements. When he spoke to the
press at different junctures, his accounts of the negotiations were terse, but he
always expressed hope that an agreement could be found. 38 Nothing was
conveyed that could be misinterpreted or that exalted the role or importance
of the mediator. Throughout, Senator Mitchell helped build toward an
agreement by reminding the parties that the people wanted peace and that the
alternative to an agreement was not acceptable. 39
Senator Mitchell's service as chair of the peace talks was, I believe, a
testament to the viability of American mediation in international dispute
resolution. He brought to his assignment extraordinary personal qualities
(most importantly listening, patience, and perseverance) and superlative
experience at the center of American politics. The discipline that he brought
to his office and the respect he gave to each party engaged in the process are
a model for anyone asked to mediate a dispute, whether or not in a context of
armed conflict.
C. The PeaceAgreement
The Agreement acknowledged that only the people of Northern Ireland
could decide its future. 40 Further, it created important institutions for
governance such as a Northern Ireland Assembly, with a Cabinet-like
Executive. 4 1 In addition, it established a North/South Ministerial Council to
foster greater relationships with the Republic of Ireland 42 and set up bodies

37 Id. at 165.
38 Id. at 87, 97, 98, 127 & 158 (demonstrating Senator Mitchell's constant effort to
remain positive and hopeful no matter how difficult progress became).
39
Id. at xiii.
40 Agreement, supra note 133, Constitutional Issues I 2(i)-(v).
41 Id. Strand One: Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland 913.
42 Id. Strand Two: North/South Ministerial Council 4.
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to deal with policing, decommissioning of weapons, and confidence-building
43
measures.
Despite the progress, however, "there is not yet a durable peace," 44 with
outbreaks of violence continuing and a suspension of the power-sharing
Northern Ireland Assembly in effect. 45 Difficult issues of implementing the
Agreement also exist in such areas as police reform and decommissioning,
46
but important steps in both areas have occurred.
Nevertheless, the final settlement is noteworthy for how many interests
of both Nationalists and Unionists it reflects. For Nationalists, their
participation in the government of the North and the release of prisoners
were of major importance. For Unionists, the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland and the decommissioning of weapons were paramount. By
identifying and negotiating many issues, the parties were able to find many
areas to compromise and, in the give and take, to have their important
interests recognized.
D. Beyond the Peace Agreement
As the peace process took shape in the 1990s in Northern Ireland,
mediation activities elsewhere in that society were occurring, and they are
expanding as this Article goes to press. Some of these efforts involve parade
disputes at the interfaces that bring the different Nationalist and Unionist
communities in contact with each other.47 Other mediation activities involve
community disputes of an infinite variety. Mediation activities are also
plentiful in the workplace, in schools, in incarceration facilities, and in the
legal profession.
On a visit to Northern Ireland a few years ago, I had occasion to meet a
number of young students engaged as mediators in their school and learned
that one of the challenges they faced was how to maintain one's neutrality
43 Id. Decommissioning & Policing and Justice
7-9.
44 MITCHELL, supra note 8, at xi.
45 See Warren Hoge, The Troubles in Ulster Shift from Street to the Assembly, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at Al (reporting that Britain declared the Northern Ireland
Assembly suspended, after the legislature's Protestant members said they would resign
their posts-in effect ending the power-sharing government-in protest of continuing
IRA activities); see also Warren Hoge, The Last Hard Case: Bleak, Stubborn Belfast,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at A4 (describing Northern Ireland as a balkanized northern
fringe of Europe and stating the peace agreement has yet to bring permanent political
stability to Northern Ireland).
46 Dunn & Nolan-Haley, supra note 7, at 1373.
47 Mediation's role in resolving parade disputes is discussed in further detail at Part
lI.B., infra.
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when mediating among friends. More recently, in a program at Columbia
University involving a group of peace builders from Northern Ireland, they
told me that they considered neutrality to be the most important characteristic
for service as a mediator. They emphasized the importance of a mediator
gaining an understanding of all parties involved in a dispute by meeting
separately with everyone involved and avoiding words and conduct that
might suggest partiality. They mentioned, as an example of a helpful
approach, a team of mediators (one Catholic and one Protestant) who each
met with members of the Unionist and Nationalist communities so as to be
better informed about the dispute they were to mediate. It was important,
they said, that each be seen as making an effort to be objective. Brendan
McAllister, who has done much to institutionalize mediation in Northern
Ireland, has described the following characteristics that he has tried to bring
to the process: impartiality, a focus on the "human dimensions" of the
conflict, attention to restoration of relationships, familiarity with the context,
and a search for solutions that address the problems at hand. 48 He and his
colleagues have enjoyed many successes.
IV. INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE "AMERICAN MODEL"

Some observers have stated that the American Model of dispute
resolution is too rule-bound to succeed in the context of an intractable armed
conflict. This perception calls into question two aspects of the American
Model: 1) its rule-based approach to the mediation of a given dispute, and 2)
its emphasis on the neutrality of the independent third party mediator. Brian
Currin of South Africa, who spent two years in Northern Ireland mediating
parade disputes, notes:
My perception of American style mediation is that it is inclined to be
rule bound. What makes that more problematic is that the rules have been
developed in the US. These rules facilitate conciliation in the US because
they are themselves an expression of American thinking and culture. It's
like the West assuming that if a Country does not have a multi-party system
it cannot be a democracy. In my experience mediation processes need to be
contextual. I for example found that my approach to mediation in SA [South
Africa] is very different from my approach in NI [Northern
Ireland] ... Before a foreigner can mediate successfully in another country

48 See Brendan McAllister, Mediation and Peace-Building, Feb. 2000, available at
http://www.mediation-network.org.uk/html/papers.html.

240
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he or she must understand the culture, the traditions, the people, the issues
49
and all the sensitivities-a very tall order.
Others in Northern Ireland have noted that armed conflicts are crosscultural, typically involving estranged communities with a lack of
understanding for the competing goals and interests of the other parties
involved. 50 Consequently, an independent third party without a vested
interest in the outcome, utilizing a structure not in tune with the context of
the mediation, will reach a partial settlement at best. 5 1
Quite clearly, rules not formatted to the context of an international
dispute may sacrifice the interests of the parties involved. 52 According to one
observer, such rules can be structured into a model with very detailed
procedures as the basis, 53 involving assumptions not necessarily shared or
recognized by the participants. 54 If a participant disputes any of the ordered
rules or procedures, possibly resulting in a lack of participation by a party not
coming to the table, the results will necessarily be less successful. 55 Thus, in
order to sustain a successful international mediation, experience suggests that
there must be flexibility based on an understanding of the situations and
cultures involved, rooted in local realities. 5 6 Interestingly, Senator Mitchell
has noted that his political experience taught him "the importance of having a
plan and sticking to it while retaining the flexibility to make adjustments as
circumstances change; the necessity of total commitment; and the need for
' 57
patience and perseverance to overcome inevitable setbacks.
As to the neutrality of the mediator, with full prior disclosure of possible
conflicts of interest, such an imperative may be unworkable in the context of
international armed conflicts. 5 8 International mediators are often chosen
49 E-mail from Brian Currin, international mediator based in South Africa (Nov. 5,
2002) (on file with author).
50 See Brendan McAllister, The Role of Mediation in Conflict Resolution, Apr. 26,
2001, available at http://www.mediation-network.org.uk/html/papers.html.
51 E-mail from Sue Williams, peacemaking activist in Northern Ireland (Oct. 23,
2002) (on file with author).
52 E-mail from Brian Currin, supra note 49 (noting the differences in his approach to
mediation in South Africa and Northern Ireland).
53 E-mail from Sue Williams, supra note 51 (citing the ordered structure of Herbert
Kelman's "Problem-Solving Workshops").
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.; see also e-mail from Brian Currin, supra note 49.
57 See MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 8.
58 Marie Olson & Frederic S. Pearson, Civil War Characteristics,Mediators, and
Resolution, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 421, 421-45 (2002).
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because of their relation to the dispute, rather than distance from the
dispute. 59 In Civil War Characteristics,Mediators, and Resolution, Marie
Olson and Frederic S. Pearson focus on this principle broadly, dividing the
earth into seven regions with distinct identities.60 Their theory is that
mediators with like regional identities to parties involved in armed conflicts
must live directly with the results of their labor. 6 1 Conversely, neutral
mediators indicate a physical separation from the conflict's consequences,
62
lacking an outcome preference.
A. Northern Ireland'sParadesDisputes
In the context of Northern Ireland, the identity of the mediator has a
more localized significance. An example of this is in the resolution of
parades disputes. Parades, as a commemoration of significant historical
events based upon religious, national, or political identity, have been a
significant aspect of Irish life for hundreds of years. 6 3 In the late 1990s,
however, parade disputes, which often involved violent clashes of Catholics
and Protestants with each other or the police, rose in number and began to
dominate the political agenda. 64 In an effort to resolve the annual dispute
over parade routes, the Northern Ireland government solicited The
Independent Review of Parades and Marches (Review), released in January
1997.65 The Review received over three hundred submissions of suggestions
for parade dispute reform, including submissions from local communities
and major political parties and NGOs alike. 66 This expression of local
sentiment resulted in the Public Processions Act of February 1998 (Act),
creating the Parades Commission (Commission). 67 The Act states that the
goals of the Commission are to promote greater understanding of the issues
relating to public processions, and to promote and facilitate mediation as a
means of resolving disputes. 6 8 Currently, the Commission uses twelve
59
60

Id. at 424.
Id. (North America, Central and South America, Africa, Middle East, Central and
South Asia, the Pacific, and Europe).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 425.
63 Neil Jarman, Regulating Rights and ManagingPrinciple Order: ParadeDisputes
and the Peace Process, 1995-1998, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1415, 1416 (1999).
64 Id. at 1415.
65 Id. at 1425.
66 Id. at 1426.
67 Id. at 1429.
68 Id. at 1430.

PEACE-MAKING MEDIATOR

authorized officers (equally divided between Protestants and Catholics) who
are self-employed non-staff members, to collect local sentiment leading up to
a parade and report it to the Commission. 69 There is a similarity between
what they do and sometimes what mediators do in an informal kind of way.
The goal of the Commission's informal mediation is to "help strengthen the
position of those people on either side of a dispute, who have difficulties in
engaging in direct discussions with opponents... playing a growing part in
70
resolving disputes behind the scenes."
One significant example of a parade dispute using local mediators with a
vested interest in the result to facilitate dialogue and a peaceful resolution is
the Apprentice Boys' "Relief of Derry" celebration in the city of Derry.7 1 In
1995, with the re-opening of the Derry walls, the Apprentice Boys attempted
to march the full circuit of the walls for the first time since 1969.72 The
Bogside Residents Group (BRG), representing the Catholic community
inhabiting the area of the city within the walls, occupied sections of the walls
during the night without any face-to-face communication. 7 3 When the issue
resurfaced in 1996, the BRG and Apprentice Boys agreed to meet face-toface, enlisting local M.P. John Hume to facilitate negotiations. 74 The groups
met a total of four times, each submitting a separate set of proposals for
75
evaluation.
In 1997, the newly formed commission became involved, and an effort to
resolve the dispute began months in advance. 76 In an effort to open
discussions to a wider constituency, eighty representatives of local business,
church, and statutory communities were invited to participate in two single
identity debates. 77 When the BRG and Apprentice Boys initially refused to
meet, the Mayor of Derry offered his services and office as mediator. 78 The
Mayor began by presenting the resolution proposals of the two parties to the
69 Parades Commission for Northern Ireland, FourthAnnual Report, Apr. 2001 Mar.
2002.
70 Press Release, Parades Commission for Northern Ireland, News from the Parades
Commission: Parades Commission Annual Report 2001-2002 (June 20, 2002) (on file
with author).
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representatives of the single identity debates. 79 In an effort to further
communication, the Mayor and Commission facilitated proximity-style talks
between the groups, culminating in face-to-face meetings the week before the
scheduled parade. 80 While no settlement was reached, the parade followed a
partial route in the absence of violence during a time of heightened conflict
in the rest of Northern Ireland. 8 1 Thanks to mediation efforts, subsequent
marches of the Apprentice Boys have occurred without any major eruptions
82
of violence.
The lack of a permanent resolution of this particular Parade issue should
not overshadow the steps taken towards reaching a mutually acceptable
result. The two parties have not only responded to the involvement of local
business leaders who most certainly had a stake in the outcome, but at times
they even requested meetings with the Mayor, John Hume, M.P., and other
leaders. This furthers the idea that a mediator to an armed conflict must
identify with the local community, showing not only an interest in reaching a
result, but also that the result would affect the mediator as well as the parties
involved.
B. An American Counter-Example
An example of a program in the United States that expresses the
advantages of breaking from the status quo of neutrality is Herbert Kelman' s
Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) at
Harvard University. 8 3 Kelman theorizes that a balanced team of participants
is necessary for the resolution of a dispute. 84 Sharing a personal identity with
one party to a dispute can add credibility to a mediator, implying genuine
79 Id.

80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See Parade Hailed as Flagship, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 4, 1999, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hii/northern_ireland/549874.stm (observing that the Protestant
parade in Northern Ireland had passed off relatively peacefully for the first time in recent
years); see also Apprentice Boys' Parades Pass Off Peacefully, RTE NEWS, Aug. 12,
2000, at http:lwww.rte.ie/news/2000/O812/north.html (describing how the annual parade
in Derry passed off without serious incident); Parade Passes Off Quietly, BBC NEWS
ONLINE, Aug. 11, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/ northemireland/1485107.stm
(noting that the Apprentice Boys' march through Derry took place without any violent
disruptions).
83 Herbert C. Kelman, Experiences from 30 Years of Action Research on the IsraeliPalestinianConflict, at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/news/2002/kelman-peace
making.php3.
84 Id.
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personal concern for the outcome, rather than ulterior motives. 85 Conversely,
86
ethnic identities may raise questions of bias from an opposing party.
However, a balanced team of participants implies not neutrality, but even87
handedness.
PICAR aims to influence the macro-process of dispute resolution by
informing participants through micro-processes of dialogue. In order for the
macro-process to succeed, it must follow broad general steps: identification
and analysis of the problem, joint shaping of ideas for solution of the dispute,
influencing the other side through positive incentives, and creating a
supportive environment for negotiations. 8 8 These goals can be daunting in
the face of an intractable dispute raised to the level of armed conflict. PICAR
establishes micro-processes involving parties to the dispute in an attempt to
provide positive inputs into the macro-process, and hopefully to serve as a
89
metaphor for an eventual outcome at the macro-level.
These micro-process techniques are exemplified by Problem-Solving
Workshops (Workshop). 90 The Workshops are not negotiations and are not
meant to be binding. 9 1 Instead, they are meant to provide a closed arena for
participants, authorized to negotiate, to conduct exploratory interaction
impossible in a negotiation setting.92 Ideally, these communications and
observations create new ideas and understandings that can be fed into the
political debate. 93 The Workshop's third party does not participate
substantively in the discussions or offer solutions, merely monitoring the
ground rules and setting agendas for discussion. 94 The underlying goal of the
Workshop is to create an understanding of the other party's perspective that
can be disseminated into the macro-process of resolving the dispute.
C. A BriefReturn to the Peace Process
Applying the forgoing observations to the Northern Ireland Peace
Agreement, Senator Mitchell has shown that a deep understanding of the
parties is, in fact, inherent in the American Model. His persistent listening
85 Id.
86
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91 Id.
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and understanding established a vested interest in the result, although it was
not based on his physical geography. Additionally, such American practices
as shuttle diplomacy and the use of committees and sub-committees are
typical of both gaining trust, and building a deep understanding of the
dispute. Mitchell's extension of the deadline in the last weeks of the peace
talks is evidence that rules and procedures are meant to further the result;
they are not greater than the result. When agreement was in jeopardy, the
rules were adjusted in an effort to reach a result.
V. CONCLUSION

What then might be said about mediation in armed conflict from the
perspective of a survey of mediation in Northern Ireland?
The appropriateness of mediating in armed conflict raises questions
involving the context of the dispute, its receptiveness to a mediation process,'
who should participate in the mediation and under what circumstances, and
who should serve as the mediator or mediators and by what method of
appointment. As noted, Northern Ireland was ready for the peace talks as a
result of much hard work by the Irish and British governments and some of
the party leaders, informed by a widespread feeling among the people that a
solution needed to be found. The pre-negotiation development was extensive,
setting an important framework for the talks. Without such pre-conditioning,
it is doubtful that any success could have been achieved. In terms of the
talks, the attention to detail given by George Mitchell, to the fairness of the
process, and to each party every step of the way enhanced his credibility,
inspired trust and confidence, and ultimately led to his ability to keep the
parties working toward an acceptable agreement in the darkest of moments.
If there is anything I saw in Senator Mitchell's style, as I have already noted,
it was the respect he gave to everyone, coupled with his scrupulous
avoidance of conduct that would have undermined his office and his
enormous ability to lower the "temperature" and keep hope alive. This model
of mediation clearly has a distinct place in situations of armed conflict.
To what extent models of mediation used in the United States can
successfully be practiced abroad by our citizens is a separate question. For
reasons applicable to Northern Ireland, an American chair of the talks was
acceptable to the convening parties, the Irish and British governments. The
outside mediator, however, may not always be the right choice to deal with
other disputes within a society faced with arms. As noted in a communication
I recently received from Brian Speers, a distinguished lawyer in Northern
Ireland who has done pioneering work in the area of mediation:
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In our social and political life, I believe there is a tiredness with
"outsiders" becoming involved-however well meaning they are. The
people who live here and work here need to become able to interact with
each other directly and not feel someone will come running to help. That
attitude in my view leads to a lack of acceptance of the due weight of
95
responsibility.
He adds, "[p]erhaps the single observation I would make is that outsiders
can teach, give valuable perspective and encourage but they will in time
withdraw and the challenge will be to ensure that sufficient local expertise is
available to provide that same support from within."'96 Another thoughtful
communication I received from Sue Williams, a distinguished consultant in
the area of mediation in Northern Ireland, also emphasized the importance of
taking account of the local realties. 9 7 She observed that most armed conflicts
are cross-cultural and therefore the mediation approach that works best must
reflect a very good understanding and analysis of the situation and cultures
involved. 98 In identifying herself with flexible approaches, she pointed to the
stages of a conflict. There may be a need, she said, for a convoking role for a
third party, referring to Jimmy Carter; or there may be a need for a detailed
negotiation and someone like George Mitchell; and there may be a need for
other types of third party assistance after an agreement is reached. 99
According to Speers and others with whom I have spoken in Northern
Ireland, there is a place for a new type of mediation, aimed at managing,
rather than resolving, a dispute.10 0 Where substantial differences exist, there
is much to be gained, Speers said, from providing a listening post and a safe
environment to share ideas and try on new thinking.' 0 1 He added that many
of the skills involved in the more formal process are helpful here, such as
summarizing, listening, and managing a dialogue. 102 Avery Bowser, who has
been involved with mediation involving families and the youth in Northern
Ireland, finds American mediation practice useful, if not applied
mechanistically. 10 3 He mentioned a number of situations with which he was
95 E-mail from Brian Speers, CMG Solicitors, Belfast (Oct. 14, 2002) (on file with

author).
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98 Id.
99 Id.
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103 Telephone interview with Allan Craig, Governor IV of the Northern Ireland
Prison Service (notes on file with author).
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familiar where the mediator was someone known to the parties and might not
have satisfied an American conflict of interest standard, but yet had the
ability to inspire confidence and trust by creating conditions under which the
parties wanted to support what they felt they had created on their own in the
mediation process. 10 4 He stressed the importance of paying attention to what
parties want and said that mediators from abroad must convey their ideas
with humility and with an openness to learn from the experiences of
others. 105
Because of his work in Northern Ireland prior to the peace negotiations,
on both economic relations and decommissioning, Senator Mitchell was
familiar with the country, its people, their culture, and the conflict. This
previous involvement, along with his ties to America as a former Senator,
caused him to have greater concern not just for his personal reputation but
also for a successful peace process. The United States wanted the people of
Northern Ireland to achieve a peaceful resolution to the "Troubles" and
Senator Mitchell wanted the same for the people and country he had come to
know so well.
It is clear that there are many opportunities for those who live in the
United States to contribute to the promotion of mediation abroad. We have
much to offer in terms of our models and, in turn, there is much we can learn
from what is occurring abroad in the handling of difficult ethnic and racial
disputes. This country's growing attention to the field of ethics in mediation,
on the importance of mediator training, and on the quality of mediators and
the processes they use all seem highly relevant to the mediation of conflicts
in societies dealing with armed conflict.
Citizens who serve abroad, of course, must become knowledgeable about
the country involved in order to have any chance of being credible. No
matter what model is used, without in-depth knowledge, missteps are likely
to occur in the most basic of areas, such as the language used, the clothes
worn, the places stayed, etc. It is hard to see how a mediator unfamiliar with
the context can be productive and helpful in framing issues and working with
parties in the creation of options and in finding a solution. Despite the
challenges, American mediation practice and mediators, as demonstrated by
Senator George Mitchell, have played and can play a positive role in a world
filled with much conflict.
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